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Abstract 
 
A traditional conception of ontology takes existence to be its proprietary subject 
matter—ontology is the study of what exists (§ 1). Recently, Jonathan Schaffer 
has argued that ontology is better thought of rather as the study of what is basic or 
fundamental in reality (§ 2). My goal here is twofold. First, I want to argue that 
while Schaffer’s characterization is quite plausible for some ontological questions, 
for others it is not (§ 3). More importantly, I want to offer a unified characteriza-
tion of ontology that covers both existence and fundamentality questions (§§ 4-5). 
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A traditional conception of ontology takes existence to be its proprietary subject 
matter—ontology is the study of what exists (§ 1). Recently, Jonathan Schaffer 
has argued that ontology is better thought of rather as the study of what is basic 
or fundamental in reality (§ 2). My goal here is twofold. First, I want to argue 
that while Schaffer’s characterization is quite plausible for some ontological 
questions, for others it is not (§ 3). More importantly, I want to offer a unified 
characterization of ontology that covers both existence and fundamentality 
questions (§§ 4-5).  
 
1. Ontology as the Study of Existence 
Textbook presentations of what ontology is virtually always characterize it in 
terms of existence questions. This is true of both ‘classic’ and more recent pres-
entations. Recall the opening sentences of Quine’s (1948: 21) “On What There 
Is”: 
 
A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put in 
three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: ‘What is there?’ 
 
More recent presentations by leading metaphysicians agree in essence. Here is 
van Inwagen (1998: 16): 
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One very important part of metaphysics has to do with what there is, with what 
exists. This part of metaphysics is called ontology. Ontology, that is, is the part 
of metaphysics that deals with metaphysical statements having general form like 
‘An X exists’ and ‘There are Ys’. 
 
And here is Sider (2007: 4): 
 
Thus, we have very general ontological questions (existence questions) about ob-
jects… Other ontological questions include the question discussed above of 
whether properties exist, the question of whether numbers exist, and even the 
‘metaontological’ question of what it means to investigate whether objects of a 
certain sort ‘really’ exist. 
 
On this view, the goal of ontology is to produce a list of all things, in the broad-
est possible sense of ‘thing’—all entities, all quantifiabilia, all ontoids. 
The thesis that the subject matter of ontology is existence is thus quite en-
trenched. One question is what sort of thesis it is supposed to be. It could be con-
strued as a stipulative statement about how the term ‘ontology’ is to be used. 
Typically, however, it is meant as a substantive claim. One substantive interpreta-
tion of it might be as a sociological claim: that people calling themselves ontolo-
gists tend to work on existence questions. But again, the thesis seems meant as 
more interesting than that. The idea rather seems to be that there is a class of 
questions that seem to belong together—a ‘natural’ class of questions1—and that 
the deep commonality among those is that they concern existence. It is some-
thing like this claim that Schaffer (2009) has recently contested. 
 
2. Ontology as the Study of Fundamentality 
According to Schaffer, a closer examination of the relevant natural class of ques-
tions reveals that the deep underlying commonality among them pertains not to 
existence but to basicness or fundamentality.  
Consider nominalism about properties. It is possible to interpret nominal-
ists as not really denying the very existence of properties. After all, they do not 
deny that there are ways concrete particulars are—that the table is rectangular, is 
brown, is wooden, and so on. Rather, what they deny the existence of are cer-
tain abstract objects (universals) that some identify properties with. Instead, 
nominalists claim that the table’s rectangularity consists in its belonging to a 
specific class or collection of exactly resembling concrete particulars; that the 
table is brown in virtue of belonging to another collection of exactly resembling 
concrete particulars; and so on.2 That is, they insist that properties are nothing 
but collections of particulars—that a thing’s having a property is grounded in its 	  
1 Here the notion of ‘naturalness’ is that developed to handle various forms of (alleged) 
semantic indeterminacy—the notion worked out (e.g.) by Lewis (1984) and Sider (2011). 
2 Two comments are in order here. First, one way of understanding what a ‘collection’ is 
casts is as an abstract entity as well, though not a universal but a set. However, there are 
ways of construing ‘collection’ so that it is not abstract—say, if one used it the way the 
notion of ‘plurality’ is used in mereology. Secondly, I am focusing here on so-called re-
semblance nominalism; there are other versions, of course. Also, in most versions of 
nominalism the set is taken to include all possible exactly resembling particulars, not just 
all actual ones.  
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membership in such a collection.3 The view, so understood, is that there are 
properties, but their existence is grounded in that of particulars, which are there-
fore the more fundamental entities.  
Schaffer’s claim is that this diagnosis applies generally to ontological de-
bates. Nominalism in mathematics is better understood not as the claim that 
there are no numbers, but as the claim that numbers are grounded more funda-
mental entities (perhaps collections of collections of particulars—3, for example, 
is but the collection of all three-object collections).4 The bundle theory of objects 
is better thought of not as denying the existence of objects but as grounding it in 
sets of co-instantiated properties, while the trope bundle theory grounds objects 
in sets of compresent tropes. Conceptualism about properties or numbers is the 
claim that properties or numbers are grounded in ideas, or idea types, in the 
minds of suitably engaged subjects. In general (2009: 347): 
 
Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, 
and numbers exist. Of course they do! The question is whether or not they are 
fundamental. 
 
On this conception, the goal of metaphysics is not to produce a list of all enti-
ties. Rather, it is to identify the ungrounded grounders of reality: the primitive enti-
ties that do not exist in virtue of—are not grounded in—any other entities, but 
instead serve to ground the existence of others.5 
Schaffer’s case for this is threefold. First, he outlines an induction from sev-
eral central ontological debates. Secondly, he argues that existence questions are 
trivial whereas fundamentality questions are nontrivial. Thirdly, he argues that 
the methodology standardly used to resolve ontological disputes cannot answer 
existence questions without also answering fundamentality questions. I will not 
rehearse the entire case here, but it is worth pausing to appreciate the second 
consideration (regarding triviality). Schaffer (2009: 357-9) notes that there are 
straightforward, indeed all too facile, arguments for the existence of numbers, 
properties, composite particulars, and fictional objects. We can reason that since 
there are prime numbers greater than 7, there are numbers; that since there are 
properties that people share, there are properties; and so on. The only nontrivial 
questions in the area are whether numbers, properties, composites, and ficta are 
fundamental and ungrounded or on the contrary grounded in other entities. 
One compelling feature of the fundamentality conception of ontology is 
that it makes sense of central modes of argumentation in ontological texts.6 
There are many examples of this, but perhaps the clearest pertains to the role of 
indispensability arguments in contemporary ontology, starting from Quine’s 	  
3 Here the notion of grounding is construed as the antisymmetric relation canonically 
designated by the ‘in virtue of’ location—the kind of notion worked by Fine (2001), Sider 
(2011), and others.  
4 For details of how this might work, see Maddy (1980).  
5 It is conceivable, though somewhat improbable, that there should be ungrounded enti-
ties that do not in turn ground any others. Identifying those would be part of ontology’s 
task as well.  
6 This too is a reasoning pertaining to the methodological underpinnings of ontology, but 
it is not the methodological argument Schaffer presents. Schaffer’s argument is rather 
than the standard Quinean approach to resolving ontological disputes implies pervasive 
appeal to fundamentality considerations.  
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(1948) and Putnam’s (1956) argument for mathematical entities. The claim is 
that we ought to believe in numbers because citing them is explanatorily and/or 
predictively indispensable to our best theory of the world. Setting aside wider 
issues regarding the epistemic status and merit of such arguments, observe that 
they can only be used to establish the existence of fundamental entities. Non-
fundamental, grounded, ‘derivative’ entities could not be ‘detected’ by the indis-
pensability test, since all the explanatory/predictive work they do is already 
done by the entities that ground them.7 
It may be claimed that the most important mode of ontological argumenta-
tion—namely, from parsimony—tests for existence rather than fundamentality. 
Schaffer (2009: 361) rejects this, however, claiming that of the various parsi-
mony principles we might wield in ontological debates, the most important is 
not “Do not multiply entities without necessity” but “Do not multiply basic enti-
ties without necessity.” This is because the multiplication of merely derivative 
entities is ontologically innocuous, since such entities are an ontological ‘free 
lunch’. This is not the place to consider whether non-basic entities are indeed 
ontologically gratis—that would take us too far afield. But note that if they are, 
and if the relevant parsimony principle is the one Schaffer cites, then certainly 
parsimony tests for basicness rather than existence.  
 
3. Existence Again 
Schaffer’s treatment of ontology may be quite plausible for many typical onto-
logical debates. But to some it does not apply very smoothly. When Romans 
came to believe that the frequency of rain did not depend on the whims of Jupi-
ter, and in fact Jupiter did not exist, their new view was emphatically not that 
Jupiter turns out to supervene upon, or be grounded in, the chemical processes 
leading to rain. When as children we were told that there are no ghosts and no 
monsters, and that Santa Claus does not exist, again the news our parents broke 
to us was not about grounding and fundamentality. Likewise, when early mod-
ern scientists came to believe that the best explanation of life does not appeal to 
élans vitals, that the best explanation of disease does not appeal to miasma, and 
that the best explanation of combustion does not appeal to phlogiston, their en-
suing beliefs were that there existed no élans vitals, miasma, or phlogiston—not 
that these putative entities turn out to be ‘derivative’. Thus ontological claims 
about Jupiter, Santa Claus, ghosts, élans vitals, miasma, and phlogiston are very 
hard to interpret as claims about fundamentality; much more plausibly, they are 
claims about what they seem to be about—existence.  
Some of these claims are not typically made by self-styled ontologists. But 
there are a host of debates in which self-styled ontologists do make claims that 
seem to belong to the same natural class of claims. Perhaps the clearest case is 
the debate over the existence of God. Atheists do not maintain that God trivially 
exists but is grounded in a certain collection or combination of ungodly entities.8 
They hold that God’s ontological status is the same as that of ghosts and mi-	  
7 For example, the conceptualist would have to admit that the relevant ideas explanato-
rily preempt mathematical entities, rendering them dispensable. Yet this conceptualist 
need not deny the existence of mathematical entities because of that—only their funda-
mentality.  
8 An objection from Schaffer will be considered at the end of this section.  
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asma. Part of the reason for this is that, arguably, the very notion of God, or 
even a god, as existing in virtue of some ungodly, naturalistically kosher enti-
ties—subatomic particles, say—may be incoherent. Arguably, it is part of the 
very notion of God (and of a god) that He (it) somehow transcends the natural 
world. This is why Spinoza seems to us to change the topic in his pantheistic de-
fense of God, and why Meletus in the Apology claims that Socrates denies the 
godly status of the sun and moon on the grounds that Socrates (allegedly) claims 
they are made of stone and earth (respectively).  
This sort of ‘conceptual’ consideration—a consideration to do with the very 
notion of some putative existent—is almost universally appealed to by elimina-
tivists in various areas. In the indented quote above, Schaffer mentions three pu-
tative entities whose existence is trivial: properties, meanings, and numbers. We 
have seen above that there are reasonably plausible ways of recasting ontologi-
cally skeptical claims about properties and numbers as claims about fundamen-
tality rather than existence. However, the case of meanings is trickier. Ontologi-
cal skeptics about meaning are often explicitly eliminativists—see Stich (1983) 
and Schiffer (1987)—and not merely due to confusion on their part regarding 
the real insight behind their reasoning. Such Eliminativists argue that there are 
two features that are (i) essential to meanings but (ii) nothing instantiates simul-
taneously. First, it is part of the very notion of meaning that meaning deter-
mines reference. Secondly, it is part of the same notion that meaning governs 
(the right) behavior. The meaning eliminativists argue that certain considera-
tions about the nature of causation and relational properties suggest that nothing 
can have both these properties. So upon closer examination, the very notion of 
meaning entails, against the background of the relevant considerations about 
causation and relational properties, that there are no meanings. 
The philosophy of mind has involved several ontological debates that con-
cern existence questions proper—questions that, again, do not easily support re-
interpretation as fundamentality questions. Opponents of Cartesian dualism 
genuinely deny the existence of an immortal soul; they do not simply argue that 
such a soul is grounded in brain processes. Eliminative materialists extend the 
same treatment to the mental at large. Part of their argument is that the dualist is 
right to deny the reducibility (or grounding) of the mental. Again, the reason for 
this is often partly conceptual: the very notion of the mental is claimed to involve 
features that nothing in fact exhibits. Rorty (1965), for example, argues that the 
mental is by definition private, but since nothing is in fact private in the relevant 
sense, nothing is mental. This is different from claiming that the mental is noth-
ing but the cerebral. In fact, it involves using the principle of identity of indis-
cernibles to deny any such reduction or grounding claim: the mental is by defini-
tion F (private) whereas the cerebral is not-F.  
In the background of many contemporary ontological debates in philoso-
phy of mind and other areas is a commitment to a naturalistic worldview. It is 
this commitment that produces much of the dialectical pressure against souls, 
God, ghosts, etc. Yet this very commitment is best understood in terms of the 
denial of the very existence, and not just fundamentality, of certain entities—
namely, supernatural entities.  
I conclude that while for some existence questions there is a reasonably 
plausible interpretation that casts them as targeting fundamentality (numbers 
and properties being perhaps good examples), for many there is not (God, 
meaning, mind, and naturalism inter alia). This appears to undermine Schaffer’s 
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inductive support for the fundamentality conception of ontology. Furthermore, 
while some ontological methods (e.g., the appeal to indispensability) fit well in a 
fundamentality conception, it is not clear how that conception accommodates 
the role of conceptual analysis; whereas, as suggested above and argued more 
fully in the next section, a more inclusive conception of ontology might.  
This leaves the issue of triviality. Recall that Schaffer’s case for the funda-
mentality conception relied in part on the ready availability of ‘trivial inferences’ 
for existence (e.g., the inference from “There are prime numbers greater than 7” 
to “There are numbers”). In fact, suggests Schaffer, such inferences are available 
in virtually every ontological dispute. Discussing the debate over the existence 
of God, Schaffer (2009: 359) remarks: “I think even this is a trivial yes (and I am 
an atheist). The atheistic view is that God is a fictional character.” What makes 
this ‘a trivial yes’, according to Schaffer, is that there are trivial inferences to the 
existence of ficta—e.g., an inference from “There are several existentially disori-
ented (fictional) characters in Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina” to “There are (fictional) 
characters.” Similar moves could be made for meaning, mind, etc. The funda-
mentality conception might be thus defended on the grounds that such trivial 
inferences demonstrate the triviality of existence questions. Since ontological 
questions are often nontrivial, they must concern something other than exis-
tence after all.9 
My response has two parts. First an impression: the treatment of the onto-
logical question surrounding God as not an existence question simply feels 
much less natural, and much more forced, than the parallel treatment of the on-
tological questions surrounding properties and numbers. On the face of it, the 
debate over God’s existence is in the main not a debate over the existence of a 
fictional character. On the contrary, it is precisely a debate over whether God is 
fictional or not (read: real or unreal). Theists believe that God is no more fic-
tional than Napoleon—both make an appearance in various texts, including 
works of fiction, but both exist text-independently. By contrast, atheists, often 
motivated by naturalistic considerations, believe that there is no God period—the 
whole thing is a piece of fiction.10 Furthermore, if we accept the trivial inference 
to the existence of ficta, then anything we conceive of automatically comes to 
exist—as a fictional object.11 This is a remarkable power for us to have. It is also 
a limitless power: since we can conceive of impossible objects, those exist as 
well. (Consider: “There are some seriously cool impossible objects in M.C. 
Escher’s paintings,” therefore “There are impossible objects.”) The first part of 
my response is simply to record the impression that something feels forced and 
unnatural about the interpretation of certain ontological questions as fundamen-
tality rather than existence questions (through appeal to these trivial infer-
ences)—while for other ontological questions that interpretation feels illuminat-
ing and instructive.12 	  
9 Thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for pressing me on this.  
10 The view that God exists as a fictional character is of course an epistemically possible 
option (as Schaffer notes, atheists are not committed to rejecting fictional characters), but 
there is nothing trivial about the view that this is a coherent view.  
11 Thanks to Carolina Sartorio for drawing my attention to this.  
12 It should also be noted that just as there are forced moves that can remove existence 
from the second group, so there are artificial moves that can remove fundamentality from 
the first group. Schaffer (2009: 365) considers such a move, one that packs information 
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The second part of my response is to infer that there appears to be some 
underlying dissimilarity among two types of ontological question here. Recall 
the status of the thesis that fundamentality rather than existence is the proper 
subject matter of ontology: it is not a stipulation and not a sociological claim, 
but a claim about an underlying deep commonality among ontological ques-
tions. The discussion in this section seems to suggest that there is no immediate 
commonality to begin with. There are, in fact, two very different types of onto-
logical questions: those which can be reinterpreted as concerning fundamental-
ity only through the use of ‘trivial inferences’, and those for which such interpre-
tation does not rely only on those inferences. Once we conceive of ontological 
questions as dividing into (at bottom) two separate and quite different varieties, 
it is extremely natural to conceive of one variety as fundamentality questions and 
the other as existence questions. It is probably coherent to treat them as two differ-
ent types of fundamentality question, or for that matter two different types of 
existence question, but there is little point in doing so. 
 
4. Toward an Inclusive Approach 
The philosophy of mind is a particularly instructive area, since debates between 
reductivists and eliminativists have often been explicit. The reductive materialist 
countenances the mental but denies the dualist view that it is fundamental; on 
the contrary, she claims that mental facts are grounded in (hold in virtue of) 
physical facts. The eliminative materialist takes herself to say something 
stronger: that there are no mental facts. The debate can be appreciated through a 
simple inconsistent triad of antecedently plausible theses: 
(1) The mental is not physical. 
(2) Something is mental. 
(3) Everything is physical. 
Accordingly, there are three main positions in the debate: reductive materialism 
denies only (1) in this triad, eliminative materialism denies only (2), and dual-
ism only (3). (So-called nonreductive materialism is based on separating the 
cases of tokens and types, or states and properties, rejecting (1) for the to-
kens/states and (3) for types/properties.) 
My suggestion is that such a triad characterizes all typical ontological de-
bates. In such a triad, there is always a reductive option, an eliminative option, 
and a primitivist option. Consider the ontology of objects: 
(1) Objects are more than just bundles of properties. 
(2) There are objects. 
(3) Everything is ‘made up of’ (grounded in) properties. 
In his discussion of different versions of the bundle theory, Van Cleve (1985) 
ends with an articulation of an eliminative version that denies the existence of 	  
about grounding into the description of putative entities. For example, instead of asking 
whether numbers exist (a simple existence question) or whether numbers are fundamen-
tal (a fundamentality question), we can ask whether fundamental (i.e., ungrounded) 
numbers exist (a sophisticated existence question). Schaffer offers two responses, but nei-
ther contests the feasibility of such a move, only the lessons we might want to draw from 
it. 	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objects altogether, replacing them with property bundles rather than reducing 
them thereto. The standard versions he discusses, however, are clearly reduc-
tive. These versions deny only (1) in the above triad. The more radical version 
he finally articulates denies only (2). More realist approaches to objects that 
posit them as fundamental existents deny only (3): they are primitivist about ob-
jects.  
Similar treatments can be given to other central ontological debates. The 
debate over properties could be understood in terms of the following triad: 
(1) Properties are more than just collections of particulars. 
(2) There are properties. 
(3) Everything is grounded in particulars. 
The reductive nominalist denies (1), the eliminative nominalist denies (2), and 
the proponent of universals (the ‘realist’) is a primitivist who denies (3). Like-
wise for numbers: 
(1) Numbers are irreducible to (collections of) collections of particulars. 
(2) There are numbers. 
(3) Everything is grounded in particulars. 
At the same time, the debate over the existence of God can be framed in the 
same way: 
(1) God is not grounded in natural phenomena. 
(2) God exists. 
(3) Natural phenomena exhaust reality. 
Schaffer’s view that God exists as a fictional character would involve rejecting 
(1) here. The more standard atheist view involves rejecting (2). The theist view 
rejects (3). 
The same treatment applies to ontological debates not discussed above. 
Debates on color tend to be torn between a variety of potential reductions (to 
reflective and refractive properties, dispositions to elicit experiences, categorical 
bases of such dispositions, etc.), denial of the very existence of colors (e.g., 
Maund 1995), and a primitivism about colors (e.g., Campbell 1993). Debates 
over causation involve a choice between Humean reduction to (broadly speak-
ing) regularity relations (Lewis 1973), denying the very existence of causation 
(Russell 1913), and primitivist approaches that embrace a ‘secret connexion’ 
(Strawson 1989). Likewise, in addition to various reductive treatments of events 
(in terms of property exemplifications, trope pairs, etc.), there is the option of 
denying the existence of events altogether (Horgan 1978) or posit them as fun-
damental (Davidson 1967). Many other illustrations are possible. 
In some cases, this way of organizing a debate may be instructive. For some 
contemporary debates have fragmented into several sub-debates concerned with 
different facets of the same subject matter. Thus, mereological debates revolve 
around (i) the scope of composition or (ii) whether composition is identity. But 
they could also be reunified through the following triad:  
(1) Composites are not identical to fusions of simples. 
(2) There are composites. 
(3) Everything exists in virtue of the simples.  
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Mereological non-nihilists (universalists and restrictivists) who deny that com-
position is identity reject only (1) in this triad; non-nihilists who maintain that 
composition is identity reject only (3); nihilists reject only (2).13 
In all these triads, two types of entity are involved. One type concerns the 
entity in whose ontological status we are interested—the subject matter of the 
relevant debate. (This is the entity that shows up in the first and second proposi-
tions.) The other type of entity is one tentatively designated as fundamental, at 
least more fundamental—the type of entity that might potentially ground our 
subject matter. (This entity shows up in the first and third propositions.) The 
general form is thus as follows: 
(1) E is not grounded in E1,…,En. 
(2) There exists E. 
(3) Everything is grounded in E1,…,En. 
Call this the generalized triad for ontology. My claim is that every ontological 
dispute can be represented by an instance of the generalized triad. The ontologi-
cal debate forces on us a choice between grounding the subject matter, eliminat-
ing it, or positing it as ungrounded primitive.  
It might be objected that I have run together a number of different ontologi-
cal relations: grounding, reduction, identity, in-virtue-of, nothing-but, nothing-
over-and-above, etc. In response, I plead guilty. My view is that the interrela-
tions among all these notions is at present totally unclear, but the natural resem-
blance among them is clear. Accordingly, we can consider that there is a generic 
relation of ontological dependence of which they are all species. I entreat the 
reader to read the various expressions used above as informal glosses on onto-
logical dependence. The generalized triad for ontology should forsooth be 
framed as follows: 
(1) E is not ontologically dependent upon E1,…,En. 
(2) There exists E. 
(3) Everything is ontologically dependent upon E1,…,En. 
A full development of this would require an account of the ontological depend-
ence cited in (1) and (3), but also of the existence cited in (2). 
 
 
5. The Scope of Ontology 
With this general characterization at hand, we can put in place an idealized 
(and doubtless somewhat simplified) procedure for generating coherent and sta-
ble ontological theories. To a first approximation, the procedure is this. In Step 
1, we produce a comprehensive inventory of putative entities. In Step 2, we feed 
each item in this inventory into the generalized triad just described, with that 
item serving as a substitution instance of E and all other items functioning as 
E1,…,En; Going through each of these triads, we attempt to establish which val-
ues of E are such that the primitivist position is the most plausible for them. This 
produces a first outcome: a list of all ontological primitives. That is, it divides 
the set of all putative entities into two subsets: the primitive ones and the non-	  
13 This does leave a further question of how to choose between universalism and restric-
tivism as two different kinds of anti-nihilism.  
Uriah Kriegel 106	  
primitive ones. Moving now to Stage 3, we feed each member of the non-
primitive subset into a new triad in which E1,…,En are given by the members of 
the primitive subset; here we attempt to establish which values of E are such that 
reductivism is more plausible than eliminativism for them. This produces a sec-
ond outcome: a list of all ‘ontological derivatives’. That is, it divides the non-
primitive subset into two further subsets: the derivative ones and the non-
existent ones. The overall outcome is a structure that divides all putative entities 
into three classes. We might describe this structure as (S1,(S2,S3)), where S1 = the 
set of all ontological primitives, S2 = the set of all ontological derivatives, and S3 
= the set of all mere putatives.14  
As noted, this is only a first approximation. Various complications arise 
that make the procedure messier. One complication concerns guidelines for and 
constraints on what makes it into the initial list of putative types of entity. A 
deeper challenge concerns how reality as a whole is to be carved into putative 
entities (and entity types) to begin with. A third issue concerns the relationships 
between determinable entity types and their determinates within the overall 
structure. These complications, and others, underline the status of the procedure 
as (over)simplified and idealized.  
Still, the basic idea here is that all typical ontological disputes involve a 
choice among a reductive, an eliminative, and a primitivist option. The impor-
tant feature of the procedure, for present purposes, is that it addresses both exis-
tence and fundamentality questions: it involves both a choice between elimina-
tivism and non-eliminativism and a choice between reductivism and non-
reductivism (primitivism). With this in mind, call this the ‘inclusive conception 
of ontology’. Put in terms of natural classes of questions, the present thesis is 
simply this: there is a class of questions that seem to belong together ‘naturally’, 
such that the deep, underlying commonality among them is that they concern 
choice between a reductive, an eliminative, and a primitivist take on some puta-
tive entity.  
Note that both the existence and fundamentality conceptions construe on-
tological questions as demanding a choice between two options: ‘exists’ or ‘does 
not exist’ in one case, ‘is basic’ or ‘is grounded’ in the other. The inclusive 
framework suggested here demands a choice among three options: ‘exists fun-
damentally’, ‘exists non-fundamentally’, and ‘does not exist’. There is no way, 
nor need, to insist on factorizing this into several two-option ontological ques-
tions. The three-option questions address both existence and fundamentality. 
Thus what the inclusive conception contends is that there is a natural class of 
three-option forced-choice questions that collectively delimit the domain of on-
tological inquiry. 
In considering Schaffer’s case for the fundamentality conception, I have fo-
cused on triviality considerations and methodological considerations. Having 
discussed triviality in §3, let me end with a methodological consideration. I 
want to agree that some methods of ontology go to the choice between reductiv-
ism and primitivism—including, as we have seen, the appeal to indispensability 
arguments. Other methods, however, seem to go to the choice between reductiv-	  
14 Presenting this procedure has the unfortunate feature that we are quantifying over non-
existents. Arguably, however, any kind of ontological theorizing has to start with putative 
existents, and would thereby be forced to speak of what may potentially turn out to be 
non-existents.  
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ism and eliminativism. In particular, this appears to be the central role of concep-
tual analysis in ontological debates.  
Recall that the main eliminativist move in the debates considered in §3 was 
to argue that the very notion of x (say, God) is such as to exclude its grounding 
in the ys (say, subatomic particles). The only way to substantiate such claims 
about what flows from the very notion of an x is through conceptual analysis. 
This is precisely the role conceptual analysis is accorded by Frank Jackson 
(1998), through his ‘entry by entailment’ thesis: conceptual analysis helps us 
find a place (‘location’) in the world for non-fundamental entities. It does so by 
identifying analytic conditionals whose antecedents use exclusively terms for 
fundamental entities but whose consequents also use terms for non-fundamental 
entities. The goal of conceptual analysis is to determine whether such condi-
tionals exist. If for some x they do not, eliminativism about x recommends it-
self.15 If they do, reductivism does. This is not the point to launch a defense of 
conceptual analysis so characterized. My present point is simply this: the fun-
damentality conception makes no room for conceptual analysis in ontological 
methodology; the inclusive conception does. (Doubtless this will be seen by 
some as a strength of the fundamentality conception, but for those of us who take 
conceptual analysis to be a genuine and central part of legitimate ontological 
theorizing, this recommends adopting the inclusive conception.) 
 
Conclusion 
Schaffer’s critique of the existence conception of ontology strikes me as overdue: 
in many areas of ontology, the central choice is between a reductive and a primi-
tivist account of a certain putative entity. The existence of that entity is not 
really in question. Limiting ontology to existence questions would leave an 
enormous blindspot at the heart of the discipline. At the same time, moving 
away altogether from existence to fundamentality questions also misrepresents 
the structure of ontological debates. A correct conception of ontological debates, 
I have suggested, would be more inclusive. For such debates are typically three-
dimensional and involve choosing at once among three options, not two: a re-
ductive or grounding option, an eliminative option, and a nonreductive or 
primitivist option.16 
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